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A LEGITIMACY MODEL FOR THE INTERPRETATION
OF PLURALITY DECISIONS
A dissent in the court of last resort is an appeal to the brooding
spirit of the law, to the intelligence of a future day, when a later
decision may possibly correct the error into which the dissenting
judge believes the court to have been betrayed. Nor is the appeal
always in vain. In a number of cases dissenting opinions have in
time become the law.
Chief Justice Charles Evan Hughes.1
The important role that plurality decisions play in developing
the law dictates the need for an inquiry into their proper preceden-
tial value.2 In the last two decades, the dramatic increase in the use
of plurality decisions highlights a growing concern over the diffi-
culty in their interpretation.3 Part I of this Note introduces the ten-
sion between plurality decisions and traditional principles of
interpretation. Part II discusses current approaches to interpreting
plurality decisions and posits an alternative tripartite test. Part III
I CHARLES EVAN HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 68 (1937
ed.), noted in Karl M. Zo Bell, Division of Opinion in the Supreme Court: A History ofJudicial
Disintegration, 44 CORNELL L.Q. 186, 211 (1959). An opinion "concurring in judgment"
is similar to an opinion "dissenting in judgment" insofar as both "illuminate issues
which might otherwise be relegated to the obscurity of a footnote." John F. Davis &
William L. Reynolds, Juridical Cripples: Plurality Opinions in the Supreme Court, 1974 DUxE
L.J. 59, 75 n.82 (1974). See generally infra note 13 (discussing the structure of plurality
decisions).
2 Plurality decisions deal with some of the most controversial issues of our day.
See, e.g., U.S. v. Kokinda, - U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 3115 (1990) (applying First Amendment
public forum analysis to postal sidewalk); see generally Part III.B.3 (discussing the "com-
plex plurality decision"). See also Walton v. Arizona, - U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 3047 (1990)
(applying Eighth Amendment capital punishment standards to Arizona statute); County
of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S.
573 (1989) (applying First Amendment Establishment Clause analysis to religious sym-
bols within county courthouse); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469
(1989) (applying Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause to city plan favoring
minority business enterprises); Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490
(1989) (applying constitutional review of state statutory restrictions on abortions). But
see Note, Plurality Decisions and Judicial Decisionmaking, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1127, 1139 (1981)
(suggesting that most plurality decisions in nonconstitutional issue areas create little
controversy).
3 Between 1801 and 1955, the Court averaged 0.29 plurality decisions per term.
See Comment, Supreme Court No-Clear-Majority Decisions: A Study in Stare Decisis, 24 U. CHI.
L. REV. 99, 99 n.4 (1956) (discussing 45 plurality decisions). Between 1956 and 1969,
the Court averaged 3.00 plurality decisions per term. See Davis & Reynolds, supra note 1,
at 60 (discussing general trends in plurality decisions). Between 1970 and 1980, the
Court averaged 8.8 plurality decisions per term. See Note, supra note 2, at 1127 n.1,
1147 (listing 88 plurality decisions). Between 1981 and 1991, the Court averaged 10.3
plurality decisions per term. See Appendix (listing 103 plurality decisions).
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evaluates this alternative approach and suggests precedential conse-
quences that should attach to different types of plurality decisions.
I
INTRODUCTION
The doctrine of stare decisis assumes the articulation of a ma-
jority Supreme Court decision.4 As originally conceived, the doc-
trine required lower court deference to both the "outcome" of a
Supreme Court decision and the "legal rule" supporting that out-
come.5 The outcome of a decision is defined as the disposition of
the litigation with respect to the particular parties and facts before
the Court.6 The legal rule, on the other hand, is the reasoning that
a Justice adopts in reaching a particular outcome.7 The historical
evolution of the splintered decision, however, has surpassed the
original assumptions upon which the doctine of stare decisis was
based.
A. The Nature of Plurality Decisions
A plurality decision, by its very nature, represents the most un-
stable form of case law. It is the resolution of a "hard" case by a
nonunanimous Court.8 At least three opinions, resting upon di-
verse legal theories, are present in a plurality decision. The
4 HENRY C. BLACK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS 10 (1912)
(suggesting that the doctrine of stare decisis assumes a simple majority decision); Eu-
GENE WAMBAUGH, THE STUDY OF CASES 98 (2d. ed. 1894) (same). For an in-depth dis-
cussion of the doctrine of stare decisis in the context of plurality decisions, see Linda
Novak, Note, The Precedential Value of Supreme Court Plurality Decisions, 80 COL. L. REv. 756,
757-58 (1980) (discussing Black and Wambaugh).
5 James Hardisty, Reflections on Stare Decisis, 55 IND. LJ. 41, 52-57 (1979) (distin-
guishing the legal rule and the particular outcome). See generally Novak, supra note 4, at
756 nn. 8, 10 (discussing Hardisty in-depth). In the context of litigation over the Equal
Protection Clause, for example, one of three alternative legal rules is generally applica-
ble: strict scrutiny review, intermediate scrutiny review, and rational basis review. See
generally Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (plurality decision). See
discussion infra part III.A (discussing the "incoherent plurality decision"). The possible
outcomes of a Supreme Court decision are limited to a finite set of alternatives. But see
Comment, supra note 3, at 150-53 (arguing for the recognition of a third, "second-
choice minority" outcome).
6 See supra note 5 and accompanying text (describing alternative outcomes).
7 See supra note 5 and accompanying text (describing alternative legal rules).
8 Professor Dworkin suggests that hard cases arise "when no settled rule dictates a
decision either way . . ." Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1060
(1975). In a plurality decision, a substantial disagreement among the Justices exists as
to which legal rule should decide the case. See infra note 13 and accompanying text
(discussing the structure of plurality decisions). Thus, plurality decisions constitute
"hard" cases. Ronald Dworkin,Judicial Discretion, 60J. PHIL. 624,627 (1963) (when "two
textbook rules by their terms apply" or when "no textbook rule applies", then a decision
is a "hard" case). See generally Note, Dworkin's "Rights Thesis", 74 MICH. L. REv. 1167,
1171 (1976).
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Supreme Court's failure to articulate a single rule of law creates
confusion in the lower courts as how to interpret and weigh that
decision.9
Plurality decisions are unique because of a conceptual gap be-
tween the legal rule and the outcome. In "simple majority" deci-
sions, a numerical majority of Justices agree on both a single legal
rule and a single outcome. 10 On the other hand, in plurality deci-
sions, no single legal rule carries the support of all of the concurring
Justices." Instead, at least two coalitions of concurring Justices ar-
ticulate different legal rules in an attempt to justify the same
outcome.
The method by which plurality decisions are announced high-
lights their distinctive nature. A minimum of three opinions, none
with the support of more than fourJustices, combine to form a plu-
rality decision. 12 The lead opinion ("L") announces the outcome
that a numerical majority ofJustices supported, and articulates one
of several competing legal rules. Concurring opinions ("C") articu-
late alternative legal rules that independently justify the outcome
announced by the lead opinion. Often, a dissenting opinion ("D")
exists, which rejects the outcome that both the lead and concurring
opinions adopted, and articulates yet another alternative legal
rule. 13
9 See generally Davis & Reynolds, supra note 1, at 71 (suggesting that plurality deci-
sions create "confusion in the lower courts"); Douglas J. Whaley, A Suggestion for the
Prevention of No-Clear-Majority Judicial Decisions, 46 TEx. L. REV. 370, 371 (1968) (arguing
that plurality decisions represent a "breakdown in the judicial system"); Note, supra note
2, at 1128 (suggesting that plurality decisions constitute a "failure to fulfill the Court's
obligations").
10 For this Note, a "numerical" majority comprises a coalition of at least five of nine
Justices with respect to one component (i.e., the legal rule or the outcome) of a decision.
This is to be distinguished from a "simple majority decision," in which the same numeri-
cal majority that agrees on a particular outcome also agrees that a single legal rule
serves to justify that outcome. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)
(unanimous decision). See infra note 22 and accompanying text (discussing Brown).
A simple majority decision is announced as "the opinion of the Court." See, e.g.,
Brown, 347 U.S. at 486 (Warren, C.J., lead opinion) (emphasis added). A plurality deci-
sion, on the other hand, is announced as "an opinion [of the Court]." See, e.g., U.S. v.
Kokinda, - U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 3115, 3117 (1990) (O'Connor, J., lead opinion) (empha-
sis added). See discussion infra part III.B.3 (discussing the "complex plurality
decision").
11 See supra note 10 and accompanying text (discussing the distinction between a
numerical majority and a simple majority decision).
12 When the full Court is sitting, any opinion garnering the support of more than
fourJustices would trigger a "simple majority" decision. When only eightJustices are
sitting, then a coalition of four Justices might create an "affirmance by an equally di-
vided Court." When only seven Justices are sitting, a coalition of four Justices would
trigger a simple majority decision. See Recent Cases, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1307 (1973);
Note, Lower Court Disavowal of Supreme Court Precedent, 60 VA. L. REV. 494 (1974).
13 Many decisions are plurality decisions with respect to only one aspect of the case.
In these "partial" plurality decisions, the concurring Justices will introduce their opin-
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B. Principles of Precedential Legitimacy
The absence of a simple majority creates precedential uncer-
tainty in plurality decisions. This precedential uncertainty may be
seen as a function of three factors: (1) the difficulty in identifying a
particular legal rule that a numerical majority of Justices support,
(2) the difficulty in identifying a particular outcome that is justified
in light of a single legal rule, and (3) the difficulty in explaining an
adequate connection between the identified legal rule and the iden-
tified outcome. The critical inquiry is the identification of a legal
rule that should have binding precedential impact.
1. The Principle of Majoritarianism
One component of the Supreme Court decision is the "legal
rule." ' 4 The principle of majoritarianism requires the identification
of a "majority rule" a rule that a numerical majority ofJustices ex-
plicitly adopt as the law of the land.' 5 Absent this majority agree-
ment, a rule should have no binding precedential effect. Any legal
rule articulated in a plurality decision that is not a majority rule has
ion, Justice X,joined by Justice Y, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment."
See, e.g., Asarco Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605 (1989) (Brennan, J., concurring in judg-
ment).
The lead opinion is placed at the head of the decision and is announced, "Justice X,
joined by Justice Y, announced the judgment and an opinion of the Court." See, e.g.,
Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. at 3117 (1990) (O'Connor, J., lead opinion) (emphasis added).
When appropriate, the lead opinion may also be referred to as a concurring opinion.
A concurring opinion is announced, "Justice X, concurring in the judgment." See, e.g.,
Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. at 3125 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment) (emphasis added). A
"concurring opinion", as the term is used here, should be distinguished from a "simple
concurrence" ("SC"), which is a coalition ofJustices who explicitly agree with both the
legal rule and the outcome announced by the lead opinion and simply expand upon that
analysis in a separate opinion. A decision with only a simple concurrence should not be
considered a plurality decision. See discussion infra part II.C.3 (discussing the "false
plurality decision"). A simple concurrence is announced, "Justice X,joined by Justice Y,
concurs." See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1978) (Marshall, J., simple concur-
rence). The lead opinion will generally indicate that the Justices involved in a simple
concurrence are joining in the lead opinion. But see Plyler, at 203 (Brennan, J., lead opin-
ion) (failing to affirmatively indicate that the Justices joining in the simple concurrence
are also joining in the lead opinion).
A dissenting opinion is announced, "Justice X, joined by Justice Y, dissenting." See,
e.g., Plyler, at 242 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
14 See supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing the terminology of "legal
rules").
15 The principle of majoritarianism is a component of the doctrine of stare decisis.
The doctrine implicitly assumes a majoritarian requirement, insofar as a simple majority
decision is being evaluated. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (discussing the as-
sumption of a simple majority decision based on the traditional doctrine of stare deci-
sis). On the other hand, the principle of majoritarianism has independent doctrinal
underpinnings. See, e.g., United States v. Vidaver, 73 F. Supp. 382, 384 (E.D. Va. 1947)
(referring to the "doctrine of the majority opinion").
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been implicitly or explicitly rejected by a majority of the court. 16 A
numerical test for precedential legitimacy is justified by the incoher-
ence of any approach that does not incorporate a numerical
component.
One line of reasoning, supporting the need to identify a major-
ity rule, argues that Supreme Court decisions are generated through
"bandwagoning," where individual Justices form temporary coali-
tions supporting or opposing a particular legal rule and outcome.' 7
Pursuant to this individualized perspective, the only possible
method to distinguish the victorious coalition from the defeated co-
alition is a numerical standard.
An alternative line of reasoning views the announcement of a
Supreme Court decision as something more than the tabulation of
juridical votes. Pursuant to this holistic perspective, the decision an-
nounced by a simple majority of Justices transcends the shifting
preferences of individual Justices and becomes "the opinion of the
16 A nonmajority rule may be explicitly rejected. Thus, in Regents of Univ. of Cal.
v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (plurality decision), the rule of law articulated by justice
Stevens (that review pursuant to federal statute was sufficient to resolve the case) is
explicitly rejected by a majority of the Court. Id. at 287 (Powell, J., lead opinion) (consti-
tutional review is necessary); id at 355 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (constitutional review is
necessary). Alternatively, a nonmajority rule may be implicitly rejected. In Bakke, even
ifJustice Powell and Justice Brennan had not explicitly rejected Justice Steven's reason-
ing, the simple fact that they propose alternative standards implicitly means that they
reject the nonmajority rule. See discussion infra part III.A. (discussing the "incoherent
plurality decision").
17 The term "bandwagoning", as used here, suggests that individual Justices form
separate coalitions through joining an opinion, supporting or opposing a particular
legal rule. This use of the term should be distinguished from its application in the study
of international relations. See Saurin Shah, Balancing and Bandwagoning (May 1, 1988)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with theJohns Hopkins University library).
The individualized perspective suggests that a coalition comprising a numerical ma-
jority is the controlling faction.
[L]ike legislative action, decisions of the [Supreme] Court reflect a collec-
tive position derived from the interaction of the views of a number of
different actors-the nine Justices on the Court. In this situation, the
state court is bound only by those constraints to which a majority of the
Justices subscribes.
Earl M. Maltz, The Concept of the Doctrine of the Court in Constitutional Law, 16 GA. L. REv.
357, 399-403 (1982). See generally Zo Bell, supra note 1 (adopting an individualized per-
spective of dissentingJustices). The individualized perspective is not analytically limited
to the study of plurality decisions: dissenting opinions, see, e.g., McGautha v. California,
402 U.S. 183, 248 (1971) (Brennan,J., dissenting), simple concurrences, see, e.g., School
Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230 (1963) (Brennan,J., concur-
ring); and the articulation of beliefs in nonjudicial forums, see, e.g., William J. Brennan,
In Defense of Dissents, 37 HASTINGS LJ. 426 (1986), provide alternative grounds upon
which to base an individualized perspective of Supreme Court decisions. See generally
Laurence H. Tribe, Architect of the Bill of Rights, 77 ABAJ., Feb. 1991, at 47,48 (reviewing
Justice Brennan's contribution to constitutional law).
159719921
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
Court."18 When the Court does not speak as a single entity, the
precedential value of the legal rule is diminished. Under both the
individualized and holistic perspective, the support of a numerical
majority of Justices is a necessary component of precedential
legitimacy.
2. The Need for a Reasoned Outcome
A second component of a Supreme Court decision is the partic-
ular "outcome."' 9 The outcome announced by a Supreme Court
decision should be a logical consequence of the legal rules that the
concurring Justices provide. 20 When two or more coalitions of con-
curring Justices reach the same outcome based upon mutually ex-
clusive legal rules, then that particular outcome has not been
justified: it is merely the result of a chance happenstance, the mean-
ingless intersection of conclusions. In this situation, attributing
precedential value to any one of the alternative legal rules articu-
lated in the concurring opinions would lead to an incoherent result.
A lower court would be bound to follow a legal rule, which, had it
been applied in the plurality decision itself, would not necessarily
18 See supra note 10 (discussing the different rhetoric surrounding plurality and sim-
ple majority decisions). Pursuant to the holistic perspective of precedent, a majority
rule must be identified.
[A]n opinion that fails to command the support of a majority of the Jus-
tices participating in a case ... is not labelled an "opinion of the Court"
and has no precedential value... [it] does not articulate a rule binding
on the lower courts or one to which the Supreme Court must accord stare
decisis effect.
Richard L. Revesz & Pamela S. Karlan, Nonmajority Rules and the Supreme Court, 136 U. PA.
L. REV. 1067 (1988). This holistic perspective is most consistent with the doctrine of
stare decisis. See infra note 23 (discussing the requirement of nexus).
19 See supra note 5 and accompanying text (describing alternative outcomes).
20 Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV.
1, 19 (1959). See generally Novak, supra note 4 (discussing Wechsler in-depth). The prop-
osition that the outcome should be a logical consequence of the rationale is not accepted
unanimously. Robert H. Bork explains that the contrary view, "arrested legal realism,"
stands for the proposition that the rationale is an artificial consequence of the outcome.
ROBERT H. BORE, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 69 (1990). One articulation of legal real-
ism is found in the writings ofJustice Oliver Wendell Holmes, who argues that
It is the merit of the common law that it decides the case first and deter-
mines the principle afterwards. Looking at the forms of logic it might be
inferred that when you have [a] minor premise and a conclusion, there
must be a major, which you are always prepared then and there to assert.
But in fact lawyers, like other men, frequently see well enough how they
ought to decide on a given state of facts without being very clear as to the
[reason].
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Codes, and the Arrangement of the Law, 5 AM. L. REV. 1, 1 (1870),
cited in SHELDON M. NovICK, THE HONORABLEJUSTICE 125 (1989). The dialogue over the
true process by which a Court reaches an outcome is beyond the scope of this Note.
Moreover, to the extent that legal realism is an empirical observation, rather than a
prescriptive one, it has little bearing on this Note's conclusion. This Note hopes only to
outline how a plurality decision should be treated.
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INTERPRETING PLURALITY DECISIONS
have resulted in the same outcome.21 The outcome is justified only
when one can identify an "internal rule" that all the concurringJus-
tices agree is sufficient to reach the outcome.
3. The Nexus Requirement
The third requirement for a legitimate decision is the identifica-
tion of some nexus of agreement between the majority rule (which
identifies a legitimate rule) and the internal rule (which identifies a
legitimate outcome). This "nexus" component requires, at the very
least, that the majority rule and the internal rule be the same. In a
simple majority decision, the lead opinion always articulates both the
majority rule and the internal rule.22 Thus, by definition, a com-
plete, unitary nexus exists between the two rules. In a plurality deci-
sion, discerning a majority rule or an internal rule is questionable:
even when they are both present, they are not necessarily the
same.2
3
The doctrine of stare decisis assumes a unitary agreement be-
tween the rule and the outcome-they must be "fused into one co-
hesive whole" to form a simple majority decision.2 4 Thus, the same
coalition ofJustices must support both the majority rule and the in-
ternal rule. This strict "unitary" nexus requirement cannot be ful-
filled in a plurality decision. At best, the majority rule that one
coalition supports will happen to be the same as the internal rule
that a different coalition supports. This nonunitary nexus is the
closest agreement possible in a plurality decision.25
Ultimately, in the plurality context, the nexus requirement is
justified by the basic need for consistency. If the principle of majori-
tarianism points to one particular legal rule as precedentially legiti-
mate, but a reasoned outcome is only possible pursuant to an
21 See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1954). See discussion
infra, part III.A (discussing the "incoherent plurality decision").
22 Thus, the single opinion in Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), incor-
porated both the majority rule and the internal rule. One commentator suggests that
"[iff the Court had further split into a majority divided against itself, if the justices had
spoken as nine individuals rather than as 'the Supreme Court,' the moral authority of
Brown would perhaps have been too diluted to have led to even the gradual social
changes which it in fact inspired." Davis & Reynolds, supra note 1, at 63.
23 See, e.g., United States v. Kokinda, - U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 3115 (1990). See discus-
sion infra part II.B.3 (discussing the "complex plurality decision").
24 Novak, supra note 4, at 758. Under the traditional view of the doctrine of stare
decisis, the absence of this unity would be sufficient to diminish the precedential value of
a decision. This Note suggests that both the principle of majoritarianism and the need
for a reasoned outcome are primary principles. They are each justified, not only as
traditional components of the doctrine of stare decisis but also independently. For this
reason, they may be evaluated separately for the purpose of determining precedential
legitimacy.
25 See discussion infra part II.C.3 (discussing the "explanation plurality decision").
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alternative legal rule, then neither rule has fulfilled both the major-
ity rule and the internal rule requirement. It is only when the same
legal rule is identified under both headings that a decision is prece-
dentially legitimate.
II
ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO INTERPRETING PLURALITY
DECISIONS
A myriad of approaches to the interpretation of plurality deci-
sions has developed in the last several decades. 26 One set of ap-
proaches, the inclusive models, recognizes both a binding legal rule
and a binding outcome in every case. A second set, the exclusive
models, limits the precedential consequences of a plurality decision
to discrete categories of cases. After considering the relative merits
of each of these approaches, this Note will propose an alternative
"legitimacy model" of interpretation.
A. Inclusive Models of Interpretation
Inclusive models of interpretation use various ad hoc criteria to
identify a binding legal rule and outcome in every case. The focus is
on factors intrinsic to a particular opinion, which identifies that
opinion as meriting precedential value without referring to the
other opinions articulated in the decision. 27 A total disregard for
the importance of the relationship exists between the alternative
legal rules and between the rule and the outcome. This misconcep-
tion makes the inclusive models ultimately unsuccessful in discern-
ing a proper rule and a proper outcome.
1. The Plurality Opinion Model
One inclusive method refers to the concurring opinion that the
largest coalition of Justices supports ("the plurality opinion") for
affirmative precedential guidance. 28 Pursuant to this method, a
lower court would simply count the number of Justices supporting
26 The Supreme Court has failed to articulate a comprehensive approach to plural-
ity interpretation. See supra note 9 (discussing lower court confusion). The only discrete
method of analysis that has been explicitly recognized by the Supreme Court is the nar-
rowest grounds model. See discussion infra part II.B.1 (discussing the narrowest
grounds model).
27 These models are "inclusive" in that all plurality decisions, no matter how inco-
herent, merit precedential value. For this reason, the test for identifying the authorita-
tive rule of law in a plurality decision is based upon nonlegitimacy factors of
interpretation. "Exclusive" models, on the other hand, distinguish between those plu-
rality decisions that merit precedential value and those that do not.
28 See generally Whaley, supra note 9 (advocating the plurality opinion test); Novak,
supra note 4, at 774 n.87 (same).
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each concurring opinion, and the opinion with the most votes would
control. This approach is justified because the plurality opinion
represents the "majority of the majority": it is the opinion that the
largest coalition of Justices supports.
The plurality opinion model fails to identify either a legitimate
rule or outcome. The legal rule that the plurality opinion articu-
lates, Rule X, is not necessarily a majority rule. Indeed, in some
cases, the alternative legal rule, Rule Y, may be the majority rule.2 9
In this situation, although a numerical majority of Justices adopt
Rule Y as the proper legal rule, the plurality opinion model would
identify Rule X as precedentially binding.
Similarly, the particular outcome that the concurring Justices
adopts may not be coherently justified by Rule X. If Rule X and
Rule Y are mutually exclusive or functionally unrelated, then no
"common line of reasoning" exists that justifies the outcome. In-
deed, in those cases where Rule Y articulates the common thesis
among the concurring Justices, the adoption of the plurality opin-
ion, Rule X, would be completely incoherent.
30
The plurality opinion model seems to articulate a coherent
standard. However, the focus on numbers in the plurality opinion
model is misleading. The "majority of the majority" analysis under-
lying the plurality opinion model completely disregards the role of
the dissenting opinion. A nine Justice Court does not become a five
Justice Court just because four Justices dissent.3 1 When evaluated
against the traditional principles of interpretation, this model fails
to survive scrutiny.
2. The Persuasive Opinion Model
A second inclusive method refers to the most "persuasive"
opinion for precedential guidance. Adopting this method, a lower
court might decide that a particular opinion is the most persuasive
for any number of reasons: the reasoning is "enlightened," the
opinion is written by the most prestigious Justice, the opinion is the
lead opinion, or the opinion is consistent with prior precedent.3 2
These alternative criteria share the common characteristic that
lower courts are granted discretion in determining the state of the
law. A great deal may be said for this method of interpretation: the
29 See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988). See generally discussion supra part
III.C (discussing the "legitimate plurality decision").
30 See, e.g., Boos, 485 U.S. at 312. See generally discussion supra III.C (discussing the
"legitimate plurality decision").
31 See A.M. Honore, Ratio Decidendi: Judge and Court, 71 L.Q. REV. 196, 198 (1955).
32 See generally Novak, supra note 4; Comment, supra note 3.
16011992]
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absence of certainty for future litigation may well be counterbal-
anced by infusing a greater level of dialogue in lower courts.
The benefits that flow from this persuasiveness test do not
pierce the issue of precedential value. It is not the attribution of
stare decisis value, but rather the recognition that the precedential
inquiry is not possible in the plurality context that creates the inci-
dental benefit of lower court fermentation. This inclusive method,
in short, is an abdication of the precedential inquiry. Moreover,
when compared to the plurality opinion test, this persuasiveness test
pales. To the extent that a lower court might designate the non-
plurality opinion as the most persuasive opinion, any kind of at-
tempt at numerical legitimacy is abandoned.
The inclusive method of attributing precedential value to a par-
ticular opinion, by disregarding the alternative opinions, is unjusti-
fied. The persuasiveness test fails to provide an objective criterion
by which to discern precedential value. The plurality opinion test,
while providing an objective criterion, fails to justify the use of the
test. Any inclusive method, operating upon the false assumption
that a legal rule is discernible in every plurality decision, is forced to
adopt blanket methods that fail to survive analytical scrutiny.
B. Exclusive Models of Interpretation
An exclusive model of interpretation recognizes a binding legal
rule in only limited circumstances. Plurality decisions that merit
precedential value are distinguished from those that do not. The
critical inquiry is whether the standard is consistent with traditional
principles of interpretation.33 Two exclusive models will be evalu-
ated: the dual-majority model and the narrowest grounds model.
Each of these methods have individual relative strengths that will be
relied upon in forming the legitimacy model.
1. The Dual-Majority Model
The dual-majority model recognizes a binding legal rule when a
numerical majority of Justices supports it.34 Thus, it is only when
the dissenting opinion and one of the concurring opinions advocate
the same legal rule that precedential value is attributed to a plurality
decision. This model relies exclusively on the principle of majori-
tarianism in order to identify a legal rule.
33 See supra note 27 (distinguishing inclusive and exclusive models).
34 See generally Davis & Reynolds, supra note 1; Note, supra note 2; Novak, supra note
[Vol. 77:15931602
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The dual-majority model, however, fails to identify a legal rule
that coherently justifies the particular outcome of the case.35 The
focus of the dual-majority decision is on the legal rule that the dis-
senting opinion articulates: the concurring opinion, which articu-
lates the same legal rule as the dissenting opinion, is the
precedentially mandatory opinion. This reliance upon the dissent-
ing opinion to determine the proper rule means that the outcome is
not justified: the dissent is not part of the outcome and does not
serve to rationalize the decision in the case itself.
2. The Narrowest Grounds Model
The narrowest grounds model recognizes a binding legal rule
only when one of the concurring opinions is "narrower" than the
other.36 Although this is the only model of interpretation that the
Supreme Court has recognized to date, the Court has never fully
explained what it entails.3 7 The academic literature and the text of
the Supreme Court decisions support several alternative readings. 38
The only interpretation consistent with the principles of interpreta-
tion is that the narrower rule is the one that articulates a common
legal theory which the concurring Justices share. The identification
of a shared theory of law permeating the analysis of the concurring
Justices legitimates the particular outcome of a decision.
The narrowest grounds model succeeds in coherently justifying
the particular outcome of the case. The outcome of a plurality deci-
sion is a logical consequence of the legal rules that the concurring
Justices provide. The Justices supporting the broader legal rule
must necessarily recognize the validity of the narrower legal rule.
That is, if a statute is found to be constitutionally permissible pursu-
ant to a strict scrutiny standard of review, then it is necessarily per-
missible pursuant to a rational basis standard of review.39 From the
text of the alternative concurring opinions, it is possible to deter-
35 See, e.g., United States v. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. 3115 (1990). See generally discussion
infra part III.B.3 (discussing the "complex plurality decision").
36 See generally Davis & Reynolds, supra note 1; Note, supra note 2; Novak, supra note
4.
37 City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S. 750 (1988) (discussing
Saia v. People of State of New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948); Marks v. United States, 430
U.S. 188 (1977) (discussing A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of
Pleasure" v. Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Mass., 383 U.S. 413 (1966) (plu-
rality decision); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (discussing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238 (1972) (per curiam decision).
38 See generally Novak, supra note 4 (discussing Supreme Court precedent of "nar-
rowest grounds").
39 See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990) (plurality decision). See
generally discussion supra part III.B.2 (discussing the "narrowest grounds" plurality
decision).
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mine that if all of the Justices apply the narrower rule, the outcome
would have been the same.
The narrowest grounds model is inconsistent with the principle
of majoritarianism. The driving force behind majoritarianism is the
requirement that a numerical majority agree upon a single legal
rule. The legal rule that the narrowest concurring opinion articu-
lates does not necessarily fulfill this condition. Although the nar-
rower legal rule may share certain aspects of the broader legal rule,
it does not necessarily follow that the Justices supporting the
broader rule accept the validity of the narrower rule. Indeed, the
fact that the decision creates a split concurrence suggests that some
Justices do not accept the validity of the narrower rule.
To construe the narrower legal rule as the majority rule is mis-
guided. It is true that the coalition of Justices supporting the
broader rule would necessarily reach the same outcome under the
narrower rule. This seems to suggest that this coalition implicitly
accepts the narrower rule. However, in future decisions, the coali-
tion supporting the broader rule will "implicitly" agree with the nar-
rower rule only on those occasions when the same particular
outcome is achieved. When the alternative outcome results, no ba-
sis exists for believing that the Justices supporting the broader rule
will still accept the principles underlying the narrower rule. This
one-way flow of legitimacy disallows imputing a majority agreement
on the narrower rule.
C. An Alternative Approach to Interpreting Plurality Decisions
This Note advocates the recognition of five categories of plural-
ity decisions, each with different precedential implications. 40 Plural-
ity decisions should be differentiated by three factors: the presence
or absence of a majority rule, the presence or absence of an internal
rule, and the presence or absence of an agreement between the ma-
jority rule and the internal rule. The critical task, then, is to identify
methods of discerning the majority rule and the internal rule. The
two exclusive models discussed above succeed in properly identify-
ing these two rules.
1. Testing for Precedential Legitimacy
The dual-majority model successfully identifies the majority
rule. For a dual-majority to exist, there must be agreement between
at least one coalition of concurring Justices and one coalition of dis-
sentingJustices. It is only those plurality decisions in which a dual-
40 A sixth category is the "false plurality decision," which will not be discussed in
depth. See discussion supra part II.C.3 (discussing the "false plurality decisions").
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majority exists that a numerical majority ofJustices explicitly advo-
cates a single rule of law.
The narrowest grounds model successfully identifies the inter-
nal rule. In a plurality decision, the lead opinion might be inter-
preted to hold that "Rule X justifies Outcome Z." Similarly, the
concurring opinion might be interpreted to hold that "Rule Yjusti-
fies Outcome Z." The critical issue is the nature of the relationship
between Rule X and Rule Y. When Rule X and Rule Y are in a
narrower-broader relationship (e.g., Rule X is narrower than Rule Y
given Outcome Z), then an internal rule may be discerned.4 1 On the
other hand, when Rule X and Rule Y are not in a narrower-broader
relationship, either because the rules are mutually exclusive or be-
cause the rules are simply unrelated, then an internal rule may not
be discerned.
42
Recognizing the presence or absence of an agreement between
the majority rule and the internal rule is a relatively simple matter.
A lower court should compare the concurring opinion that articu-
lates the majority rule with the concurring opinion that articulates
the internal rule. If it is the same opinion, then there is agreement.
If it is not the same opinion, then no agreement exists.
2. The Categorization of Plurality Decisions
The tripartite test yields five different categories of plurality de-
cisions. In the "incoherent plurality decision," neither the majority
rule nor the internal rule are discernible. 43 In the "dual-majority
41 The concurring opinion may be imputed with the holding that "Rule Y (and
necessarily Rule X) justify Outcome Z." The internal rule, Rule X, is a common grounds
of agreement among all of the concurringJustices: if the plurality decision at hand had
been evaluated exclusively pursuant to Rule X, both the lead opinion and the concurring
opinion would still have achieved Outcome Z.
42 First, if Rule X and Rule Y are mutually exclusive rules, then the lead opinion
may be imputed with the holding that "Rule X (and not Rule Y) justifies Outcome Z."
Similarly, the concurring opinion may be imputed with the holding that "Rule Y (and
not Rule X) justifies Outcome Z." In this situation, no internal rule exists: if the plural-
ity decision had been evaluated exclusively pursuant to Rule X, the concurring opinion
would not have reached the same outcome; if the plurality decision had been evaluated
exclusively pursuant to Rule Y, the lead opinion would not have reached the same out-
come. The outcome is simply not justified by a coherent set of concurring opinions.
Second, if Rule X and Rule Y are simply unrelated rules, there is no internal rule.
The lead opinion is holding that "Rule X (not a subset of Rule Y) justifies Outcome Z."
The concurring opinion is holding that "Rule Y (not a subset of Rule X) justifies Out-
come Z." Even though the lead opinion does not explicitly reject Rule Y, it is simply
unknown what outcome the lead opinion would have chosen. Similarly, even though the
concurring opinion does not explicitly reject Rule X, it is simply unknown what outcome
the concurring opinion would have chosen.
43 See discussion infra part III.A (discussing the "incoherent plurality decision").
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plurality decision" only the majority rule is discernible. 44 In the
"narrowest grounds plurality decision," only the internal rule is dis-
cernible.45 In the "complex plurality decision," no agreement exists
between the majority rule and the internal rule.46 In the "legitimate
plurality decision," a majority rule is discernible, an internal rule is
discernible, and an agreement exists between the majority rule and
the internal rule.47 Each type of plurality decision yields different
precedential consequences.
In an attempt to clarify the relationship between the majority
rule, the internal rule, and the requirement of an agreement as be-




Rule # 1 > Rule #2 > Rule #3




Scanning the matrix, one can conclude that no majority rule exists49
and that the two Justice concurrent ("C(2)") announced the internal
rule,50 Rule #2. Thus, this is a "narrowest grounds plurality deci-
44 See discussion infra part III.B.1 (discussing the "dual-majority plurality
decision").
45 See discussion infra part III.B.2 (discussing the "narrowest grounds plurality
decision").
46 See discussion infra part III.B.3 (discussing the "complex plurality decision").
47 See discussion infra part III.C (discussing the "legitimate plurality decision").
48 The vertical axis represents alternative outcomes. See generally supra note 5 (dis-
cussing "outcomes"). The horizontal axis represents alternative legal rules. See generally
supra note 5 (discussing "legal rules"). The greater than (" > ") symbol is used to indi-
cate that, with respect to Outcome #1, Rule #3 is narrower than Rule #2, which in
turn is narrower than Rule #1. In this hypothetical, three Justices, in the lead opinion
and the simple concurrence, held that Rule #1 was the proper legal rule and that Out-
come #I was the proper outcome. Two Justices, in the concurring opinion, held that
Outcome # 1 was proper, but did so on the basis of Rule #2. Finally, fourJustices, in
the dissenting opinion, argued that Outcome #2 was proper on the basis of Rule #3.
49 The failure to locate five Justices in any one column (Rule #1, Rule #2, or Rule
#3) indicates the absence of a majority rule. See discussion supra, part I.B. 1 (discussing
"majority rule").
50 One coalition of concurring Justices advocates Rule #1. A second coalition of
concurringJustices advocates Rule #2. As indicated by the greater than (">") symbol,




sion." This matrix will be applied throughout Part III in evaluating
plurality decisions. The general nature of this matrix will be intro-
duced in the next section on "false" plurality decisions.
3. False Plurality Decisions
There exists a category of plurality decisions, the "false plural-
ity," that legitimacy analysis does not sufficiently evaluate. Those
decisions in which no ultimate disagreement exists between the lead
and concurring opinions, as to the proper rule of law, fall within this
category.5 1 These are "easy" cases because that the concurringJus-
tices agree on the ultimate rationale supports the plurality out-
come. 52 Lower courts face no pragmatic difficulty in applying the
decision as precedent in future cases. The only reason the decision
is considered a plurality decision is because of the terminology that
the Justices use.53
In the "explanation" plurality, the lead and concurring opin-
ions agree on one applicable rule, but provide different explana-
tions for applying that standard. In these cases, a majority coalition
exists with respect to both the proper outcome and the proper rule
needed to justify that outcome. 54
TABLE Two





The relationship between the alternative rules and the alternative
outcomes is unimportant in these cases because a numerical major-
51 These decisions are "false plurality decisions" in the sense that they do not cre-
ate the interpretive tension that is the characteristic of true plurality decisions. To a
large extent, their presence in Supreme Court literature might be diminished through
the use of simple concurrence opinions.
52 Cf supra note 8 and accompanying text (discussing plurality decisions in the con-
text of Dworkin's "hard case" thesis).
53 The mere existence of an alternative opinion that is labelled a "concurrence in
judgment" and carries the weight of a necessary coalition ofJustices is sufficient to cre-
ate the false plurality decision. See generally supra note 13 (discussing the structure of
plurality decisions).
54 They are similar to "simple" majority decisions because a unity exists between
the primary plurality that advocates the plurality outcome and the secondary plurality
that advocates the legitimate rationale.
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ity agrees on both.55 For the same reason, the positioning of the
dissenting opinion, with respect to the lead and concurring opinion,
is unimportant. 56
This type of plurality decision does not raise precedential ten-
sions: both a numerically legitimate standard and an analytically le-
gitimate outcome exist. The absence of a numerically justified
explanation fails to discredit the applicability of the standard to the
law. A lower court, when faced with such a decision, should have no
difficulty in discerning both the rationale and the outcome: there is
no inherent ambiguity with respect to the standard of law enunci-
ated in the decision.
The "mislabelled plurality" describes those decisions in which
the "concurrence in judgment" is in substance a simple concur-
rence.57 In these cases, an agreement between the lead and concur-
ring opinion also exists as to both the proper standard and the
proper outcome in a case.
TABLE THREE
Rule #1 Rule #2 Rule #3
Outcome # 1 D(3)
Outcome #2 L(2)
G(4)
The Mislabelled Plurality Decision
Again, the positioning of the dissent is unimportant to the stare de-
cisis consequences of the opinion. To the extent that a numerical
majority exists in both the standard and the outcome, there is a le-
gitimate standard.
The legitimacy consequences of a mislabelled simple concur-
rence plurality compel the same line of analysis as the explanation
plurality. A legitimate rationale exists because a numerical majority
agrees that Rule # 1 is the proper standard under which to review
55 In the explanation plurality, the relation between the standards is unimportant
because only one standard has to be reviewed with respect to precedential value. Any
alternative standard that a dissenting opinion might advocate is not only inferentially
rejected by the primary plurality, but is also affirmatively rejected by the primary plural-
ity in its explicit adoption of the alternative standard.
56 For examples of explanation pluralities, see Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal.,
495 U.S. 604 (1990); Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 (1990); Local #391 v. Terry,
494 U.S. 558 (1990).
57 It is a "mislabelled" plurality decision because the proper label would be to call




the case. A legitimate outcome is evident because, as tested under
Rule #1, a numerical majority agrees that Outcome #2 is proper.
Unlike the explanation plurality, no disagreement exists as to why
the rule of law is applicable. Therefore, the rationale and the out-
come are legitimate.
In addition to these two false plurality decisions, lower courts
should consider the implications of two further categories of plural-
ity decisions that are "false" for different reasons. In this second
false plurality subcategory, the presence of structural tension is in-
sufficient to create precedential tension. Here, the terminology fails
to indicate a plurality decision, but the substantive analysis underly-
ing the alternative rules does lend itself to legitimacy analysis.
The "mislabelled plurality concurrence" is the opposite of the
"mislabelled simple concurrence" plurality.58 In a mislabelled plu-
rality concurrence, an opinion labelled a simple concurrence is, in
substance, a plurality concurrence. From a structural perspective,
this creates an interpretive tension characteristic of true plurality
decisions.
TABLE FOUR
Rule #1 Rule #2 Rule #3
Outcome #1 D(4)
Outcome #2 SC(1) L(4)
The Mislabelled Plurality Concurrence
Again, positioning of different opinions in outcomes and standards
is not important. The defining characteristic of the "mislabelled
plurality concurrence" is that the opinion designated as a simple
concurrence (i.e., Justice X concurs) actually advocates an alterna-
tive standard to the one articulated in the lead opinion.
Viewed from a legitimacy perspective, this decision should be
characterized as a true plurality decision. No numerical majority
exists regarding the proper standard applicable in such a case. Be-
cause that the concurring Justices label their opinion as a simple
concurrence and not as a concurrence in judgment, they are joining
in the lead opinion by definition. Thus, although the substance of
their simple concurrence is different from the lead opinion, they are,
58 See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 203 (1982) (mislabelled plurality concurrence).
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in actuality deemed joining the lead opinion. This decision is a sim-
ple majority opinion.
Finally, in the "splintered" decision, three or more coalitions of
Justices advocate alternative legal rules, but the lead opinion inde-
pendently succeeds in garnering the support of a simple majority of
Justices. 59 As in the mislabelled plurality concurrence decision, the
substantive analysis of the decision seems to indicate that plurality
analysis is applicable. However, unlike the mislabelled simple con-
currence, the concurring opinion fails to upset the numerical major-
ity garnered by the lead opinion. Like the mislabelled plurality
concurrence decision, the structural format can take a variety of
forms.
TABLE FIVE
Rule #1 Rule #2
Outcome #1 C(1) M(5)
Outcome #2 D(3)
The Non-Numerical Plurality
The analysis, which concurring and dissenting Justices articulate, is
irrelevant for precedential purposes because of the existence of a
majority opinion.
The precedential value of the splintered decision is not in ques-
tion. A simple majority of Justices has agreed that Rule #2 is the
proper standard and that, by reason of this standard, Outcome #1
is justified. This type of decision merits attention in a discussion of
plurality decisions because the difference in substantive analysis
that the three coalitions of Justices articulate is similar to true plu-
rality decisions.
III
A LEGITIMACY MODEL FOR INTERPRETING PLURALITY
DECISIONS
Supreme Court jurisprudence revolving around the balancing
of constitutionally protected interests provides an interesting set of
plurality decisions needed to evaluate the legitimacy model.60 The
59 See, e.g., Department of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (splin-
tered decision).
60 Constitutional balancing cases can be analyzed under the legitimacy model be-
cause they often involve shifting coalitions ofJustices supporting different (but related)
[Vol. 77:15931610
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five types of plurality decisions resulting from tripartite legitimacy
analysis will be evaluated in the context of these constitutional bal-
ancing test cases. 61 This Note suggests that each category of plural-
ity decisions triggers different questions of precedential legitimacy
and, ultimately, diverse precedential consequences.
A. The Incoherent Plurality Decision
The "incoherent plurality decision" merits no binding prece-
dential value. The controlling characteristic of the incoherent plu-
rality decision is the presence of at least three coalitions of Justices
who cannot agree whether a particular rule or unrelated alternative
rules are valid. In this situation, neither the rule nor the outcome
should have mandatory precedential effect. 62
A classic example of the incoherent plurality decision is Regents
of the University of California v. Bakke. 63 At issue64 was the Medical
School's affirmative admissions program.65 The lead opinion, rec-
ognizing that the admissions program utilized a "classification based
on race and ethnic background," applied traditional strict scrutiny
review and ruled that the program was unconstitutional. 66 The con-
curring opinion, arguing that the applicability of Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act 67 prevented the Court from reaching the constitutional
issue, concluded that the Davis admissions program was illegal pur-
rules and different outcomes. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
(1978) (plurality decision). See discussion infra part III.A (discussing the "incoherent
plurality decision").
61 The five categories are the "incoherent plurality decision," the "dual-majority
plurality decision," the "narrowest grounds plurality decision," the "complex plurality
decision," and the "legitimate plurality decision." See discussion supra part II.C.2 (dis-
cussing the categorization of plurality decisions).
62 See, e.g., American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167 (1990) (plurality
decision); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (plurality decision).
63 438 U.S. at 265.
64 A second issue, whether race may ever be considered as a factor in medical ad-
missions programs, will not be discussed here. Id. at 281 (Powell, J., lead opinion).
65 The admissions program set aside sixteen of one hundred available seats for cer-
tain minority groups. Id. at 275 (Powell,J., lead opinion). Respondent was a white male
who was denied admission to Davis Medical School in two separate years. Id. at 277. In
both years, the school admitted minority students with grade point averages, Medical
College Admissions Test scores, and benchmark scores (developed by the admissions
committee) that were "significantly lower" than the respondent's scores. Id. at 277.
66 Id. at 289 (Powell, J., lead opinion). Justice Powell argued that "to justify the use
of suspect classification, a State must show that its purpose or interest is both constitu-
tionally permissible and substantial, and that its use of the classification is 'necessary...
to the accomplishment' of its purpose or the safeguarding of its interest." Id. at 305
(quoting In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721-22 (1973)). Justice Powell distinguished the
standard of review that the dissent advocated. Id. at 301.
67 Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 601, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1988).
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suant to statutory review.68 In holding that the admissions program
survived both statutory and constitutional scrutiny, the dissenting










In Bakke, 70 neither a majority rule nor an internal rule can be
identified. 71 The absence of a majority rule means that none of the
legal rules articulated in the decision merit binding precedential
value. 72 It is wrong to attribute precedential value to a rule that a
numerical majority of the Court implicitly rejected. 73 Further, an
internal rule cannot be identified: the alternative rules articulated in
68 438 U.S. at 411 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens, joined by ChiefJustice"
Burger, Justice Stewart, and Justice Rehnquist, "concurred in the judgment in part and
dissented in part". Id. at 408 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens suggests that
"our settled practice... is to avoid the decision of a constitutional issue if a case can be
fairly decided on a statutory ground." Id. at 411 (Stevens, J., concurring).
69 Justice Brennan, joined by Justice White, Justice Marshall, and Justice Blackmun,
"concurred in the judgment in part and dissented in part". Id. at 359 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). Justice Brennan concluded that "racial classifications designed to further
remedial purposes 'must serve important governmental objectives and must be substan-
tially related to achievement of those objectives.'" Id. at 359 (Brennan,J., concurring in
part and dissentingin part) (quoted in Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317 (1977)
(quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976)). Justices White, Marshall, and Black-
mun wrote separate opinions. Id. at 379, 387, 402.
70 Id. at 265 (Powell, J., lead opinion).
71 A pitfall of the legitimacy model is the malleability of the categorical pre-defini-
tions. Thus, one could label the rule articulated in the lead opinion and the dissenting
opinion as "constitutional scrutiny" and create a majority rule. This difficulty is not fatal
if one interprets a plurality decision with a particular issue in mind. Thus, if the issue is
whether a lower court should apply a constitutional or statutory standard in resolving a
similar case, then a majority rule can be identified. If, on the other hand, the issue is
whether the Court articulated a discrete rule applicable to all future cases, then a major-
ity rule cannot be identified.
72 The principle of majoritariansim makes the presence of a majority rule a require-
ment of precedential legitimacy. See discussion supra part I.B. I (discussing the principle
of majoritarianism). Here, no single rule garners the support of a numerical majority of
Justices. See discussion supra part II.C. I (discussing the test for majority rule).
73 Each alternative rule is implicitly rejected by a majority ofJustices (i.e., both the




the concurring opinions are functionally unrelated.74 Neither strict
scrutiny constitutional review nor statutory review succeeds in inval-
idating the Davis Medical School admissions program. For exam-
ple, if all of the Justices had reviewed the admissions program
pursuant to a strict scrutiny standard, it is unclear whether the pro-
gram would have been declared unconstitutional. 75 Alternatively, if
all of the Justices had reviewed the admissions program pursuant to
the Tide VI standard alone, it is also unclear whether the program
would have been declared illegal.76 It is incomprehensible to sug-
gest that a rule, which had it been applied in the case itself might
have led to a different outcome, should control in future cases.7 7
The incoherent plurality decision fails to generate mandatory
precedential conclusions. Faced with an incoherent decision, a
lower court should recognize the incoherence and formulate a legal
rule based upon either original analysis78 or "persuasive" analysis. 79
In its search, a lower court should not be restricted, either in its
74 The strict scrutiny review advanced by the lead opinion is premised on the appli-
cability of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 438 U.S. at 289
(Powell, J., lead opinion). The statutory review that the concurring opinion advocates is
premised on the inapplicability of the Equal Protection Clause. Id at 408 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). The stated legal rules are mutually exclusive
to the extent that they disagree on whether the Equal Protection Clause applies.
75 Only the lead opinion applies the strict scrutiny standard. 438 U.S. at 268 (Pow-
ell, J., lead opinion). The concurring opinion explicitly fails to reach the constitutional
issue and explicitly declines to opine as to the result of such review. Id. at 420 (Stevens,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Similarly, the dissenting opinion's holding
that the program survives scrutiny pursuant to a substantial state interest does not nec-
essarily require that the Justices joining that opinion reach a different outcome were
strict scrutiny review applied. Id. at 268 (Powell, J., lead opinion).
76 The concurring opinion would have declared the program illegal. Id. at 420
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Both the lead and dissenting
opinion equate the prohibitions of Title VI with the prohibitions of the Equal Protection
Clause. Id. at 287 (Powell, J., lead opinion); id. at 355 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The
dissenting opinion clearly indicates that the program would have survived statutory re-
view. Id. at 350 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Prior decisions of this Court also strongly
suggest that Title VI does not prohibit the remedial use of race where such action is
constitutionally permissible."). The lead opinion, on the other hand, yields uncertain
results. IfJustice Powell had reviewed the program pursuant only to Title VI (without
the aid of constitutional interpretation), then we know only that he would have allowed
race to be taken into account. Id. at 286 (Powell, J., lead opinion). Justice Powell, how-
ever, never reaches a conclusion about the statutory test alone. Id. at 287 (Powell, J.,
lead opinion).
77 See discussion supra part I.B.2 (discussing the need for a coherent outcome).
78 The better alternative is to allow the lower court faced with an incoherent deci-
sion to develop an original rule. See Novak, supra note 4, at 781 (suggesting that lower
court experimentation would be useful).
79 The persuasive analysis may include factors identified with the inclusive models:
the lead opinion, the plurality opinion, and the persuasive opinion. See discussion supra
part II.A (discussing inclusive models of interpretation). An additional alternative might
be to rely upon the state of case law prior to the plurality decision. See, e.g., Johnston v.
IVAC Corp., 885 F.2d 1574, 1579 (1989) (relying upon prior case law). See generally supra
notes 37-41 (distinguishing mandatory and persuasive precedential effect).
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choice of rule or outcome.80 This conclusion differs sharply from
the approach generally taken by both the courts and
commentators. 8'
B. The Partially Legitimate Plurality Decision
Three of the five categories of plurality decisions are "partially"
legitimate.8 2 They partially fulfill some of the prerequisites to prec-
edential legitimacy.8 3 In this situation, no mandatory precedential
consequence results.8 4 Nonetheless, the fulfillment of one or more
of the prerequisites limits lower courts' future treatment of similar
cases. Because these limits differ, depending upon which factors are
fulfilled, each category will be reviewed separately.
1. The Dual-Majority Plurality Decision
A dual-majority plurality decision should only be given persua-
sive precedential value. The defining characteristic of this type of
decision is the presence of a majority rule tempered by the absence
of an internal rule. The absence of an internal rule frustrates efforts
to attribute binding precedential effect. The presence, however, of
a majority rule places persuasive limits on the lower courts' use of
alternative rules. The critical inquiry is whether the identification of
a majority rule is sufficient to create precedential consequences.
The Supreme Court's analysis of the due process protections
accorded to putative natural fathers provides one example of the
dual-majority plurality decision. In Michael H. v. Gerald D.,85 the
Court reviewed the validity of a California statute creating a "con-
clusive" presumption that a child born to a married woman living
with her husband was a child of the marriage.8 6 The putative natu-
ral father challenged this presumption with a due process claim
grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment. The critical issue was
80 At least one court has entirely "disavowed" the mandatory precedential value of
a plurality decision. See, e.g., Baker v. State, 289 A.2d 348, 354.(1972) (disavowing out-
come of U.S. v.Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 (1971) (plurality decision)) noted in Novak, supra note
4, at 773-74. See generally Hardisty, supra note 5 (discussing outcome stare decisis).
81 The precedential value of a plurality decision is generally accepted without criti-
cal analysis. See generally supra note 5 (discussing outcome stare decisis).
82 The dual-majority plurality decision, the narrowest grounds plurality decision,
and the complex plurality decision are "partially" legitimate. See discussion supra part
II.C.2 (discussing different categories of plurality decisions).
83 The tripartite legitimacy test requires the presence of a dual-majority, a narrow-
est grounds, and agreement between the majority rule and the internal rule. See discus-
sion supra part II.C. 1 (discussing tripartite test).
84 See generally supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text (discussing the difference
between mandatory and persuasive authority).
85 Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) reh'g denied, 111 S. Ct. 1645 (1991)
(plurality decision).
86 CAL. EVID. CODE § 621 (West 1992).
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whether the claim triggered procedural due process protections.
Five Justices agreed that the claim was properly evaluated as a pro-
cedural issue. 87 Four Justices disagreed and opined that the claim
should be evaluated exclusively as a substantive due process issue.8,
TABLE SEVEN
Procedural Substantive





Michael M. v. Gerald D.
The five opinions of the Justices disagreed as to both the
proper rule and the proper outcome in this case. In the lead opin-
ion, four Justices explicitly rejected the applicability of procedural
due process analysis. Instead, they called for an evaluation pursuant
to substantive due process.8 9 According to this analysis, the Justices
held that the statute was valid. In the concurrence, Justice Stevens
recognized that the claim should be evaluated procedurally and con-
cluded that the statute was valid.90 The four dissentingJustices held
that under a procedural due process analysis the statute was
invalid.91
The dual-majority plurality decision fails to articulate an inter-
nal rule. Procedural due process analysis and substantive due pro-
cess analysis do not follow the same reasoning. Thus, the reader is
uncertain of the result had the majority rule applied a procedural
due process analysis in this particular case. The four Justices in the
lead and simple concurrence opinions do not indicate the standard
they would have chosen pursuant to that test.
The dual-majority plurality decision should have limited prece-
dential value. The identified rule should be given precedential value
because the presence of a numerical majority ofJustices who concur
87 491 U.S. at 132 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment); Id. at 157 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting, joined by Marshall, J., and Blackmun, J.); Id. at 159 (White, J., dissenting,
joined by Brennan, J.).
88 Id. (Scalia, J., lead opinion, joined by Scalia, J., and Rehnquist, CJ.); Id.
(O'Connor, J., simple concurrence, joined by Kennedy, J.).
89 Id. (Scalia, J., lead opinion, joined by Scalia, J., and Rehnquist, CJ.); Id.
(O'Connor, J., simple concurrence, joined by Kennedy, J.).
90 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
91 Id. at 157 (Brennan,J., dissenting, joined by Marshall,J., and Blackmun,J.); id. at
159 (White, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, J.).
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justifies that rule (or no other rule is proper). The identified out-
come should not be given precedential value because the absence of
an internal rule means that the outcome is not the result of a true
majority decision.
2. The Narrowest Grounds Plurality Decision
The "narrowest grounds" plurality decision merits persuasive
precedential value. As a derivation of the narrowest grounds model,
it is the only interpretive rule that the United States Supreme Court
has explicitly recognized. 92 In this decision, one particular legal
rule coherently justifies the outcome. However, this internal rule
fails to carry the explicit support of a majority of Justices.
One example of the narrowest grounds plurality decision is
Board of Education of Westside Community Schools v. Mergens.93 Students
at Westside High School sought to form a Christian club on high
school premises based on the Equal Access Act.94 The School
Board argued that applying the Equal Access Act would violate the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.95 The dissenting
opinion declined to reach the constitutional issue and held that the
Equal Access Act did not support the students' claim that they
should be able to form a Christian club school premises. 96
A majority of the Justices, however, did reach the First Amend-
ment issue. The lead opinion held that the Equal Access Act prop-
erly allowed the formation of a religious club because the school, in
allowing meetings on school premises, was not "actually endorsing"
a particular religion.97 The first concurring opinion ("C 1") agreed
with the outcome, but argued that "endorsement" was an improper
test for evaluating Establishment Clause claims and advocated the
adoption of a "coercion" standard. 98 Thus, if the Equal Access Act
allowed schools to "directly coerce" religious beliefs, then it would
be invalid pursuant to the Establishment Clause. The second con-
curring opinion ("C2") agreed that the Equal Access Act, as
applied, was not invalid, but argued that the proper standard was
92 See discussion supra part II.B.2 (discussing the narrowest grounds model).
93 Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990) (plurality decision).
94 21 U.S.C. §§ 4071 (1988).
95 Student religious groups brought an action against the school district, under the
Equal Access Act, to allow the formation of a Christian club at the high school. The
school board argued that the Equal Access Act, as applied, violated the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 226 (plurality decision).
96 Id. at 270 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
97 Id. at 231 (O'Connor, lead opinion, joined by Rehnquist, CJ., White, J., Black-
mun, J.).
98 Id. at 258 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment, joined by Scalia, J.).
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Board of Education of Westside Community Schools v. Mergens
The narrowest grounds plurality decision succeeds in coher-
ently justifying the outcome, but fails to identify a majority rule.'0 0
All eight concurring Justices would agree with the reasoning of the
first concurrence ("C1"): that if a statute allows the "direct coer-
cion" of a religious belief, it is invalid. Six of the eight concurring
Justices would agree with the reasoning of the lead opinion that any
statute "actually endorses" a religious belief is invalid pursuant to
the Establishment Clause. Only two Justices, however, argue that
any statute which "appears to endorse" a religion is constitutionally
invalid. Thus either the "direct coercion" or the "actual endorse-
ment" test is proper.10'
The absence of a majority rule discredits this decision.
Although the "actual endorsement" test coherently justifies the con-
clusion that the Equal Access Act, as applied, does not violate the
Establishment Clause, a majority of Justices have implicitly rejected
this standard. Both the coalition ofJustices that argues for the "ap-
pearance of endorsement" test and the coalition that argues for the
''coercion" test implicitly agree that the "actual endorsement" test
should not control.
The narrowest grounds decision merits only persuasive prece-
dential value. The need for a majority rule makes mandatory prece-
dential value improper. However, the narrower grounds (in this
case either the "direct coercion" or the "actual endorsement" test)
99 Id. at 262 (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment, joined by Brennan, J.).
100 None of the three Establishment Clause standards was supported by a numerical
majority ofJustices.
101 The three alternative rules are functionally related. The concurring opinion's
"appearance of endorsement" test is the broadest of the three rules. The two Justices
joining in that opinion necessarily believe that the Equal Access Act does not "actually
endorse" or "directly coerce" religious beliefs. Mergens, 496 U.S. 262 (Marshall,J., con-
curring in judgment, joined by Brennan, J.).
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justifies the outcome. When no alternative rule exists that alsojusti-
fies the outcome, lower courts should attribute persuasive authority
to precedent on the narrowest grounds.
3. The Complex Plurality Decision
The third partially legitimate decision, the "complex" plurality,
is analytically incoherent and should be completely disavowed. The
presence of both a majority rule and an internal rule lends support
to the proposition that lower courts should attribute precedential
value to these decisions. However, in this type of decision, the ma-
jority rule analysis and the internal rule analysis lead to conflicting
conclusions. The absence of agreement makes this the most difficult
category of plurality decision to evaluate.
One recent example of the complex plurality decision is found
in United States v. Kokinda. In this First Amendment case, the
Supreme Court examined the applicability of the public forum anal-
ysis to post office sidewalks. 10 2 At issue was the validity of a United
States Postal Service regulation that prohibits individuals from solic-
itating contributions on postal premises.10 3 The lead opinion, hold-
ing the regulation valid, reasons that post office sidewalks were not
traditional public fora and the regulation is therefore entitled to ra-
tional basis review.'0 4 The dissenting opinion, finding the regula-
tion invalid, determines that post office sidewalks were traditional
public fora and the regulation should therefore be reviewed pursu-
ant to a strict scrutiny standard.1 05 The concurring opinion agrees
with the lead opinion as to the validity of the regulation, but bases
its decision on a strict scrutiny test that the dissent advocated. 106
102 U.S. v. Kokinda, - U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 3115 (1990). Public forum analysis is a
"tripartite framework for determining how First Amendment interets are
to be analyzed with respect to Government property, Regulation of
speech activity on governmental property that has been traditionally
open to the public for expressive activity, such as public streets and parks,
is examined under strict scrutiny ... Regulation of speech on property
that the Government has expressly dedictated to speech activity is also
examined under strict scrutiny... But regulation of speech activity where
the Government has not dedicated its property to First Amendment activ-
ity is examined only for reasonableness."
Id., 110 S. Ct. at 3119-20 (O'Connor, J., lead opinion, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., White,
J., and Scalia, J.) (citations omitted).
103 39 CFRT § 232.1(h)(1) (1991).
104 110 S. Ct. at 3121 (O'Connor, J., lead opinion, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., White,
J., Scalia, J.).
105 Id. at 3133 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall, J., Stevens, J., Blackmun,
J.).












United States v. Kokinda
In Kokinda, the majority rule and the internal rule diverge. The
concurring opinion articulates the majority rule: Five Justices
agreed that the Court should apply a higher standard of review.10 7
The lead opinion states the internal rule: The regulation is valid
through application of the rational basis test. Justice Kennedy, in
the concurring opinion, believes that the regulation is valid pursu-
ant to a rational basis test because he finds it valid under the higher
scrutiny of the time, place, and manner restriction.10 8 The majority
rule and the internal rule thus conflict.
Because the majority rule and the internal rule disagree, all of
the precedential difficulties articulated in the analysis of the dual-
majority and the narrowest grounds decision are triggered. The
higher review advocated by the concurrence fails to coherently jus-
tify the validation of the postal regulation and consequently cannot
be the binding rule.10 9 If the Court had applied the higher standard
of review in Kokinda, then their conclusion that the postal regulation
is valid would not necessarily have resulted. 1 0 Indeed, four of the
five Justices who reviewed the case pursuant to a higher standard of
107 Five of nine Justices agree that postal sidewalks may be traditional public fora
and that a higher standard of review is triggered. This coalition of the concurring opin-
ion (Kennedy,J.) and the dissenting opinion (Brennan,J., Marshall,J., Stevens,J, Black-
mun, J.) constitute a majority of the sitting Justices.
108 The two rules that the concurring opinion and the lead opinion articulate are
functionally related. The rational basis review standard is the narrowest grounds upon
which the validity of the regulation may be justified. The concurring opinion, which
holds that the postal regulation was valid even under a higher standard of scrutiny used
from time, place, and manner restrictions, must believe that if the rational basis test
were in fact applicable, the same outcome would be achieved. The rational basis test is
the only line of reasoning acceptable to all the five Justices in the lead and concurring
opinions that would hold the postal regulation valid.
109 See discussion supra part II.B.1 (discussing the dual-majority plurality decision).
110 The lead opinion, in arguing that the postal regulation survived rational basis
review, does not give any indication as to what result they would have reached pursuant
to a strict scrutiny standard of review. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. at 3121 (O'Connor, J., lead
opinion, joined by Rehnquist, CJ., White, J., and Scalia, J.).
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scrutiny decided that the statute was invalid under that standard.11'
A lower court should not be required to apply the higher standard
in future cases because if the Supreme Court had applied the higher
standard in Kokinda itself, the postal regulation might have been
held invalid.
In addition, rational basis review cannot be the proper stan-
dard. Only four of nine Justices accept this rule of law. 112 The
otherJustices reject the rational basis standard holding that a higher
level of review should be the test. In this circumstance, a lower
court should not be required to apply the rational basis test when a
majority of the Court has explicitly rejected the standard.
The principles of interpretation underlying the legitimacy
model do not yield any definite conclusions as to how the courts
should treat "complex" plurality decisions. One alternative would
be to establish the priority of either the majority rule or the internal
rule. For example, a lower court that felt the requirement of a co-
herently justified outcome was more important than the principle of
majoritarianism might adopt the internal rule." 13 The difficulty with
this alternative is that there is no neutral basis upon which to evalu-
ate the relative merit of the two principles: both are primary princi-
ples and seek to legitimize different components of the decision, i.e.,
the rule and the outcome."14
A better alternative accepts the incoherence of both the major-
ity rule and the internal rule. As in the case of an incoherent plural-
ity decision, a lower court should experiment with its own criteria,
unrestricted by any opinion articulated in the plurality decision. 115
Since neither a legitimate rule nor a coherently reasoned outcome is
discernible from the Supreme Court, a lower court should articulate
both a rule and an outcome which they independently recognize as
proper.
C. The Legitimate Plurality Decision
Lower courts should give the "legitimate plurality decision"
binding precedential value. A decision is legitimate only when it ful-
fills all three components of precedential legitimacy: A majority
M1 Id., at 3126-27 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall, J., Stevens, J., Black-
mun, J.); Id., at 3125-26 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment).
112 Id. at 3121 (O'Connor, J., lead opinion, joined by Rehnquist, CJ., White, J.,
Scalia, J.).
113 The internal rule would probably be considered more authoritative because it is
based upon Supreme Court precedent. See generally discussion supra part II.B.2 (discuss-
ing the "narrowest grounds" model).
114 See discussion supra parts I.B. 1 (discussing the principle of majoritarianism), I.B.2
(discussing the need for a reasoned outcome).
115 See discussion supra part III.A (discussing the incoherent plurality decision).
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rule is identified, an internal rule is identified, and an agreement
exists between the two rules. 116 In the legitimate plurality decision,
it is possible to identify one particular concurring opinion that in-
corporates both the majority rule and the internal rule. The nar-
rower concurring opinion articulates a legal rule that the dissenting
opinion supports. This legal rule should have mandatory preceden-
tial value.
A plurality decision rarely fits into the legitimate plurality cate-
gory. A hypothetical example from the constitutional balancing
context explains this tendency. 117 The Court finds that a state stat-
ute does not violates the Equal Protection Clause. To reason this
conclusion two different concurring coalitions apply the strict scru-
tiny and rational basis standards. For this decision to fall within the
legitimate plurality category, the dissenting opinion would have to










This configuration is highly unlikely: a dissenting coalition, arguing
that a statute should be declared unconstitutional, would rarely
adopt the lower level of constitutional scrutiny. For the dissent to
adopt the rational basis test, they must disagree with the lead opin-
ion not only as to the choice of legal rules (rational basis or strict
scrutiny) but also as to the scope of the alternative legal rules them-
selves. The hierarchy of constitutional review itself becomes sus-
pect when a statute fails to survive rational basis review (according
to the dissenting opinion) but succeeds in surviving strict scrutiny
116 See discussion supra part II.C.2 (discussing the categorization of plurality
decisions).
117 The hypothetical is drawn from cases in the "complex plurality decision" cate-
gory. E.g., United States v. Kokinda, - U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 3115 (1990) ("complex plu-
rality decision").
118 The rational basis test is a narrower grounds than the strict scrutiny test for up-
holding the statute. The concurring Justices supporting the heightened standard must
believe that the statute survives rational basis scrutiny. Thus, a legitimate plurality deci-
sion will occur only when the dissenting opinion adopts the rational basis test.
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review (according to the local opinion). For this reason, the major-
ity rule and the internal rule will rarely agree.
One example of the "legitimate plurality decision" is Boos v.
Bany. 119 In this case, the plaintiff challenged, on First Amendment
grounds, a District of Columbia provision restricting the ability to
march within 500 feet of a foreign government's embassy.1 20 The
principal issue was whether the provision was "content-based" or
not.121 The lead opinion suggests the proper rule is to evaluate the
provision according to both the general case law on content-based
regulations and the "secondary effects" exception articulated in
Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc. 122 In the lead opinion, Justice
O'Connor concludes that the provision failed to survive scrutiny
under the case law and did not fall within the Renton exception.'
23
The concurring opinion agrees but argues that the Renton exception
is always inapplicable to political speech. 124 The dissenting opinion
concludes that the display provision survived scrutiny, but fails to
articulate clearly the legal rule it relied upon. 25 The dissenting
opinion based its decision on the lower court's ruling, which did not
specifically reach the Renton issue.'2 6 Thus, there is reason to be-
lieve that the dissenting Justices did not accept the Renton standard.
119 Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988) (plurality decision).
120 D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-1115 (1981), SJ. Res. 191, ch.29, § 1, 52 Stat. 30 (1938)
repealed by D.C. Law 7-105 § 2, 35 D.C. Reg. 728, 3659 (1988), prohibited, inter alia, the
display of signs that bring foreign governments into disrepute within 500 feet of that
country's embassy.
121 Boos, 485 U.S. at 319-21 (O'Connor, J., head opinion, joined by Stevens, J.,
ScaliaJ.). A second issue concerning the validity of the congregation clause of the D.C.
provision will not be dealt with here.
122 Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (content neutral speech
restrictions are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech); Boos,
485 U.S. at 319-21 (O'Connor, J., lead opinion, joined by Stevens, J., Scalia, J.).
Although Justice O'Connor ultimately concluded that the provision failed to survive
scrutiny, she nonetheless implied that the Renton analysis was applicable.
123 Boos, 485 U.S. at 319-21 (O'Connor, J., lead opinion, joined by Stevens,J., Scalia,
J.).
124 Id. at 337-38 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment, joined by Marshall, J.).
125 Id. at 338-39 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting, joined by WhiteJ, Blackmun,J.). Boos
is difficult to evaluate because of the relicense of the dissenting Justices. Id.
126 The lower court did, however, imply that the Renton exception was applicable to
this situation. See, e.g., Finzer v. Barry, 798 F.2d 1450, 1469 n.15 (D.C. Cir. 1986). For
this reason, the argument that the dissent did not accept the Renton standard is some-
what strained. For purposes of evaluating the category on principled grounds, this Note
will assume that the dissenting Justices adopted the "no exception" rule advocated by
the concurring opinion. This is a legitimate assumption because ultimately the lower













In Boos, the conclusion of the dissent and concurence, holding
that the Renton exception should not apply to political speech,
127
should carry binding precedential value. First, to the extent that the
dissenting opinion holds that the Renton exception is inapplicable, a
majority rule has been 11 articulated. 128 Second, the "no excep-
tion" holding is an internal rule that coherently justifies the case:
the lead opinion must recognize the reasoning of the concurring
opinion as to the "no exception" rule. 129 Third, the majority rule
and the internal rule agree. The lower courts should give the "no
exception" rule, which Justice Brennan articulates in the concurring
opinion, binding precedential value.
The absence of a true simple majority' 30 should not remove
precedential value from plurality decisions. The doctrine of stare
decisis traditionally requires that the same majority ofJustices agree
as to both the legal rule and the particular outcome.13' This per-
spective would, by definition, strip all plurality decisions of prece-
dential value.' 3 2 The justification for attributing precedential value
to the "legitimate plurality" decision does not, however, rest solely
127 485 U.S at 335-38 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment, joined by Marshall, J.).
128 Five of eight Justices declined to evaluate the provision under the Renton excep-
tion. This coalition of the concurring opinion (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J.) and
the dissenting opinion (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by White, J., Blackmun, J.) constitutes a
majority of sitting Justices. Justice Kennedy took no part in the case. See supra note 15
and accompanying text (discussing decisions by eight Justice courts).
129 The rules articulated by the concurring opinion and the lead opinion are func-
tionally related. With respect to the outcome that the provision is invalid, the "no ex-
ception" rule is the narrowest grounds upon which to justify the outcome. The lead
opinion, which held that the District of Columbia provision was invalid even if it was
evaluated under the Renton exception, must necessarily believe that if the Renton excep-
tion were in fact inapplicable, the same outcome would have been achieved. In compar-
ing the nature of the alternative rules articulated by the lead opinion and the concurring
opinion, the concurring opinion furnishes the only coherent reasoning acceptable to all
the concurring Justices for the particular outcome.
130 See supra note 8 and accompanying text (defining "simple majority").
131 See supra note 19 and accompanying text (discussing the doctrine of stare decisis).
132 Id.
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upon an affirmative parallel to simple majority decisions; rather, it
rests upon the incoherence of attributing such authority to any alter-
native rule.13
3
The legitimacy model recognizes two basic components to
precedential legitimacy. First, the majority rule is constructed to
identify a legitimate rationale. Second, the internal rule is con-
structed to justify the particular outcome. When a legitimate legal
rule (that a majority ofJustices support) serves to justify coherently
the particular outcome of the plurality decision (by providing the
narrowest grounds of agreement among the concurring Justices),
then both the legal rule and the outcome should be given binding
precedential value.
CONCLUSION
The precedential consequences of a plurality decision are a
function of the nature of alternative articulated legal rules and the
alignment of Justices with respect to those rules.13 4 Courts should
attribute persuasive authority to a legal rule that a numerical major-
ity of Justices support.135 Courts should also attribute persuasive
authority to a legal rule that the concurring Justices agree justifies
the particular outcome.' 36 Mandatory precedential value, however,
is proper only when one particular opinion incorporates both the
majority rule and the internal rule.'3 7
Plurality decisions should not confuse lower courts. The legiti-
macy model of interpretation significantly limits the use of plurality
133 The tripartite legitimacy test is based upon components of the doctrine of stare
decisis. This doctrine assumes the existence of at least a simple majority decision. For
this reason, much of the preliminary analysis seeks to identify, in plurality decisions, a
majority rule that looks like the rule found in a unanimous decision. Similarly, the iden-
tification of an internal rule is evaluated in comparison to a unanimous decision. How-
ever, both the majority rule and the internal rule have independent doctrinal
underpinnings. See discussion supra parts I.B. 1 (discussing the principle of majoritarian-
ism), I.B.2 (discussing the need for reasoned outcomes). Moreover, the incoherence of
attributing precedential value to any alternative rule is not premised upon stare decisis
doctrine. See discussion supra parts III.B. I (discussing the "dual-majority plurality deci-
sion"), III.B.2 (discussing the "narrowest grounds plurality decision").
134 See discussion supra part II.C.2 (discussing the categorization of plurality
decisions).
135 See discussion supra part III.B.I (discussing the "dual-majority plurality deci-
sion"). See generally discussion supra parts I.B.l (discussing the principle of majoritarian-
ism), II.B. 1 (discussing the dual-majority model of interpretation).
136 See discussion supra part III.B.2 (discussing the "narrowest grounds plurality de-
cision"). See generally discussion supra parts I.B.2 (discussing the need for a coherent
outcome), II.B.2 (discussing the narrowest grounds model of interpretation).
137 See discussion supra part IILC (discussing the "legitimate plurality decision");
discussion supra parts III.A (discussing the "incoherent plurality decision"), III.B.3 (dis-
cussing the "complex plurality decision"). See also supra note 7 and accompanying text.
See generally discussion supra part I.B.3 (discussing the nexus requirement).
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decisions as authoritative precedent.13 8 When controlling law is not
discernible, lower courts should feel free to experiment with alter-
native rules and outcomes based on their own criteria.' 3 9 The
Supreme Court, in announcing a plurality decision, should recog-
nize that it has abdicated its precedent-setting role and has articu-
lated instead an "appeal to the brooding spirit of the law [and] to
the intelligence of a future day."'
40
Ken Kimura
138 The inclusive methods of interpretation attribute precedential value to every plu-
rality decision. See discussion supra part II.A (discussing inclusive models). Under the
exclusive models of interpretation, a binding legal rule is identified when either a major-
ity rule or an internal rule is identified. See discussion supra part II.B (discussing exclu-
sive models). In contrast, the legitimacy model attributes precedential value to a
plurality decision only when both a majority rule and an internal rule are discernible,
and, even then, only if the two identified rules are the same. See discussion supra part
III.C (discussing the "legitimate plurality decision").
139 See supra note 9 and accompanying text 78 (discussing the merits of lower court
experimentation).
140 HUGHES, supra note 1, at 68.
16251992]
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
APPENDIX
1981 Term: Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981); Michael
M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981); Kassel v. Consol.
Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981); Rosales-Lopez v. United
States, 451 U.S. 182 (1981); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337
(1981); California Medical Ass'n v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 453 U.S.
182 (1981); Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981); Me-
tromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981). 1982 Term:
Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982); Island Trees Union Free
School Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982); Clements v. Fasing
457 U.S. 957 (1982); Northern Pipelines Const. Co. v. Marathon
Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982); Florida Dept. of State v. Treasure
Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670 (1982). 1983 Term: Connecticut v.John-
son, 460 U.S. 73 (1983); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983);
Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983); Planned Parenthood Ass'n of
Kansas City, Mo. Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983); Oregon v.
Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039 (1983); Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Service
Comm'n of City of New York, 463 U.S. 582 (1983), cert. denied, 463
U.S. 1228 (1983); Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939 (1983); Arizona
Governing Committee v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073 (1983). 1984 Term:
Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287 (1984); South Carolina v. Regan,
465 U.S. 367 (1984); Justices of Boston Court v. Lydon, 466 U.S.
294 (1984); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (2984); Wasman v.
United States, 468 U.S. 559 (1984); United States v. Karo, 468 U.S.
705 (1984). 1985 Term: NewJersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985);
Oneida County v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226 (1985); Dun
& Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985);
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985). 1986 Term: Pacific
Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1 (1986);
Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986); Turner v. Mur-
ray, 476 U.S. 28 (1986); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S.
267 (1986); International Longshoremen's Ass'n, AFL-CIO v. D.,
476 U.S. 380 (1986); Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610
(1986); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986); Attorney General v.
Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898 (1986); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399
(1986); City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561 (1986); Thornburg
v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986); Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109
(1986); Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265 (1986); Local 28 of Sheet
Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986); Federal
Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S.
238 (1986). 1987 Term: California Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n v.
Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987); Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39
(1987); Asahi Metal Indus. Co., v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102
(1987); United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987); Town of
1626 [Vol. 77:1593
INTERPRETING PLURALITY DECISIONS
Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386 (1987); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480
U.S. 709 (1987); Lukhard v. Reed, 481 U.S. 368 (1987); Gray v. Mis-
sissippi, 481 U.S. 648 (1987); Young v. United States, 481 U.S. 787
(1987); City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451 (1987); Goodman v.
Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656 (1987); Welch v. Texas Dep't of
Highways, 483 U.S. 468 (1987); Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley
Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711 (1987). 1988 Term:
City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112 (1988); Boos v. Barry,
485 U.S. 312 (1988); Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759 (1988);
Bankers Life and Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71 (1988); EEOC
v. Commercial Office Products Co., 486 U.S. 107 (1988); Sun Oil
Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717 (1988); Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S.
164 (1988); Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552 (1988); Thompson
v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988); Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and
Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988). 1989 Term: Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l
Ass'n v. Lynn, 488 U.S. 347 (1989); City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson
Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 489
U.S. 46 (1989); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989); Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); ASARCO, Inc. v. Kad-
ish, 490 U.S. 605 (1989); Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1
(1989); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989); Massachusetts
v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576 (1989);Jett v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 491
U.S. 701 (1989); Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 83 (1990); Hoffman v. Connecticut Dep't of Income
Maintenance, 492 U.S. 96 (1989); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S.
361 (1989); Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima
Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989); Webster v. Reproductive
Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490 (1989); County of Allegheny v. American
Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573 (1989). 1990 Term: Chauffeurs,
Teamsters and Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558
(1990); Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., 495 U.S. 604 (1990);
Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Comm'n of Ill., 496
U.S. 91 (1990); American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S.
167 (1990); Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990); Penn-
sylvania v. Muniz, 110 S. Ct. 2638 (1990); Hodgson v. Minnesota,
110 S. Ct. 2926 (1990); Walton v. Arizona, 110 S. Ct. 3047 (1990);
United States v. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. 3115 (1990). 1991 Term: Ari-
zona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991); Hernandez v. New
York, 111 S. Ct. 1859 (1991); Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 111 S.
Ct. 1950 (1991) Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gil-
bertson, 111 S. Ct. 2773 (1991); James B. Beam Distilling Co. v.
Georgia, 111 S. Ct. 2439 (1991); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111
S. Ct. 2456 (1991); Schad v. Arizona, 111 S. Ct. 2491 (1991);
Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991).
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